Análisis de ideas, crítica y comentario de textos clásicos. José Biedma López, Doctor en Filosofía y Ciencias de la Educación (Universidad de Granada).
lunes, 22 de febrero de 2010
Two Treatises of Governement, 1690
Esta obra del médico británico John Locke se publicó anónimamente en 1689. El primer tratado del gobierno civil de Locke es una refutación de las tesis de Robert Filmer, quien defendía el absolutismo monárquico apoyándose en la autoridad de las Sagradas Escrituras, en el "derecho divino" de los reyes, y en una concepción patriarcal del poder. Para Locke, el poder político no tiene nada que ver con la autoridad del cabeza de familia, el poder no se hereda, sólo se hereda la propiedad.
El segundo tratado, al que pertenecen los textos propuestos para Selectividad, es el más importante, y también ha sido publicado independientemente con el título de Ensayo sobre el gobierno civil, y es una de las obras claves de la historia de la filosofía política, pues está considerado el manifiesto fundacional del liberalismo político.
Está formado por 19 capítulos y 243 parágrafos, a lo largo de los cuales Locke aborda las siguientes materias: el hombre en estado de naturaleza, los derechos naturales y su legitimidad, el nacimiento de la sociedad civil, las formas de gobierno, la división del poder en legislativo, ejecutivo y federativo, el derecho de conquista, la tiranía y el derecho de rebelión.
Para Locke, el estado de naturaleza no es una situación de guerra de todos contra todos (Hobbes), sino un estado de armonía y felicidad en que el humano goza de derechos naturales: vida, libertad y propiedad. Este concepto de propiedad hace referencia a la posesión del individuo de los resultados de su trabajo, y sanciona el derecho a la propiedad de la burguesía inglesa que hizo la revolución de 1688. Así, la propiedad se justifica por el trabajo: “siempre que alguien saca alguna cosa del estado en que la naturaleza la produjo, ha puesto en esa cosa algo de su esfuerzo, le ha agregado algo que es propio suyo; y por ello, la ha convertido en propiedad suya”.
Si bien el trabajo es criterio de legitimación de la propiedad, al final del tratado, Locke admitirá también la legitimidad del sistema hereditario. El derecho a la propiedad es el más importante porque la vida y la libertad pueden interpretarse como extensiones del mismo: “cada hombre tiene la propiedad de su propia persona”.
El Leviathan de Thomas Hobbes, aun de forma implícita, está presente en este segundo tratado. La opinión de Locke sobre el estado de naturaleza pudo estar influida por el descubrimiento de comunidades inocentes, armónicas, pacíficas, y supuestamente felices, en el Océano Pacífico. Si bien el humano en estado natural goza de aquellos derechos, está expuesto al atropello: por eso nace la sociedad civil, para lograr una mayor seguridad y salvaguardar los bienes.
La monarquía absoluta no protege los derechos de los súbditos. La instancias necesarias de la sociedad civil son:
1. La ley: “una ley establecida, aceptada, conocida y firme que sirva por común consenso de norma de lo justo y de lo injusto, y de medida común”.
2. Un juez reconocido e imparcial.
3. El poder, que ha de contemplar a su vez tres instancias: el poder legislativo, que elabora la ley, el ejecutivo, encargado de hacerla cumplir, y el federativo, que mantiene las relaciones externas. El poder tiene un único objetivo: el bien común, por eso deviene depositario de los derechos naturales y en ningún caso puede legislar atentando contra ellos.
El Ensayo acaba con una legitimación del derecho de conquista, al que fija ciertos límites, y del derecho de herencia.
La crítica implacable al absolutismo lleva a Locke a vindicar los derechos políticos como garantía de conservación de la comunidad social: el derecho de rebelión y el tiranicidio. El primero se puede ejercer contra aquel gobierno que no salvaguarda los derechos naturales. Respecto al tiranicidio, Locke no llega tan lejos como el padre Juan de Mariana en el De rege et regis institutione (Toledo, 1599), modera su alcance respecto de la monarquía, afirmando que es suficiente con que el rey se subordine al Parlamento y la Constitución (monarquía constitucional): “la mejor defensa contra la rebelión, y el medio más probable de impedirla, es que el pueblo tenga poder para proveer nuevamente a su propia salvaguardia, estableciendo un nuevo poder legislativo cuando el que tenía ha actuado contrariamente a su misión atropellando la propiedad de sus súbditos”. O sea, que la mejor vacuna contra la necesidad de la rebelión y el tiranicidio es la democracia.
El pensamiento político de Locke se encuadra en la tradición del iusnaturalismo, sentando las bases de la democracia liberal sobre los derechos naturales individuales, es un catecismo protestante antiabsolutista, en que el derecho natural se ensambla con el constitucionalismo británico (Chevallier). En esta obra bebieron los publicistas, reformadores y revolucionarios ingleses, americanos y franceses, durante todo el siglo XVIII.
El Estado no tiene más función que la protección de los derechos individuales, el cauce por donde discurre el ideal del “laissez-faire” individual, que permite al sujeto creador humano realizar legítimamente sus potencias naturales.
A continuación los textos fijados para Selectividad en su original inglés, la versión de los dos Tratados la ofrece Google en imágenes, pdf y textos:
CHAPTER VII. Of political or civil society
§ 89. Whenever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, wherever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government ; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or, which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own degrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth: which judge is the legislative, or magistrate appointed by it. And wherever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.
§ 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all; for the end of civil society being to avoid and remedy these inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey; wherever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.
CHAPTER VIII. Of the beginning of political societies.
§ 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way, whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest ; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
§ 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority : for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way ; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority : or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should ; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines ; as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.
§ 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporate into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact ? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to ? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.
CHAPTER XII. Of the legislative, executive, and federative power of the commonwealth.
§ 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it. But because those laws which are constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having always business to do. And because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them; whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and government : therefore in well ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons, who, duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws; which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care that they make them for the public good.
§ 144. But because the laws, that are at once, andin a short time made, have a constant and lasting force,and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance there unto: therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thusI the legislative and executive power come often to he separated.
§ 145. There is another power in every commonwealth, which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society: for though in a commonwealth, the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and as such are governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it, are managed by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that, under this consideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other states or persons out of its community.
§ 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without the commonwealth ; and may be called federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.
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